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Abstract 
A quantitative study was conducted to examine the effect of executive compensation, 
good corporate governance (GCG), and free cash flow (FCF) on income smoothing, 
either respectively or simultaneously. By exercising 13 companies, partially from 
year 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015, and 2016, there are merely four non-smoothers out 
from 28 total samples. By using multi-linear regression model, the results show that 
executive compensation and GCG has no significant influence on income smoothing 
respectively whereas FCF is positively related to the income smoothing. However, 
these independent variables have a significant effect on the income smoothing 
practice simultaneously. 
 
Keywords: agency problem, executive compensation, good corporate governance 
(GCG), free cash flow (FCF), income smoothing 
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1. BACKGROUND 
The different perspectives of several researchers have led to some controversies of this 
practice. For some researchers, earning management is believed still in the scope of the 
accounting standards. However, numerous publications have negatively interpreted this 
practice as the act of manipulating some accounting policies or accounting numbers 
which results in the less fair financial report. The common pattern of the earning 
management is income smoothing. Income smoothing is the effort to diminish the 
extreme volatility of the income in order to keep the interest of the investors in the 
business. According to Prasetio, Astuti and Wirawan (2002), income statement, as one of 
the tools to show the performance of the company, has been the most crucial information 
that is able to be manipulated by the management since most of the companies evaluate 
the CEO based on the periodical income earned. 
Several research has been done to examine the factors that might lead to the income 
smoothing. However, some of them show inconsistent results. For this reason, the 
research is aimed to ensure the effect on three factors, namely executive compensation, 
good corporate governance (GCG), and free cash flows (FCF) on the income smoothing.  
Driven from the problem of agency, these three independent variables have appeared as 
the catalysts of the income smoothing.  
WhileFama (1980) reported that the executive compensation is a solution to diminish the 
problem between the agents (managers) and the principals (shareholders), especially in 
the form of bonuses and stock options, Healy (1985) and Bergstresser and Philippon 
(2006) opposed that executive compensation, in form of performance-based rewards, 
might create a tendency for the managers to do the income smoothing practice. In 
addition, Jensen (1986) found that another factor affects the income smoothing is free 
cash flow. Nevertheless, this factor is related to the agency theory, especially when the 
managers have clearer information about the overall company. Without a strong control 
from the shareholders, the managers are being opportunistic for themselves by doing the 
income smoothing. For those reasons, the role of GCG is a solution to ensure that the 
management act at the best interest of the stakeholders (Khomsiyah, 2003, p. 202). The 
research of Beasley (1996) also added that most of the companies have the likelihood to 
take part in the earning management when they retain vulnerable governance structure. 
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Concurrently, the availability of a GCG implementation assessment score, which is 
resulted from the observation of government, in corporation with some organizations, 
has been less exercised as the proxy of GCG in research.  
As a result, this research is aimed to analyze the significant influence of each of the 
executive compensation, FCF, GCG that lead to the income smoothing, either 
respectively or simultaneously. By developing four research problem: (1)the payment of 
executive compensation leads to the income smoothing; (2) high amount of FCF leads to 
the income smoothing; (3) the implementation of GCG is able to eliminate income 
smoothing; (4) executive compensation, FCF, and GCG are simultaneously influence the 
income smoothing, this research might positivelycontribute for more information about 
ethical behavior within the organization.  
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several research are previously observed all the matter related with income smoothing. 
Most of them have implemented the same proxies for the GCG variables, such as 
managerial ownership, institutional ownership, audit committee, and independent of 
board of director portion.  
Juniarti and Corolina (2005) mentioned that status, company size, profitability, and 
industrial sector has no effect on the income smoothing. In addition, Indraswari and 
Tenaya (2016) extended that corporate governance has no influence on income 
smoothing. However, Makaryanawati and Milani (2008) argued that even though 
corporate governance, represented by independent board of director, managerial 
ownership percentage, and institutional ownership percentage have no effect on income 
smoothing respectively, their research found that those representation of GCG have an 
effect to income smoothing simultaneously.    
Indraswari and Tenaya (2016) found that the characteristics of the company affect the 
income smoothing practice. 
Meanwhile, Mohammadi, Maharlouie, and Mansouri (2012) found that there is a 
significant positive relationship between cash holdings and income smoothing, and there 
is no significant relationship between positive changes in cash holding and income 
smoothing.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
Hypotheses Development 
From the perspective of agency relationship, executive compensation is used as the 
medium to align the interests between the top level management and the shareholders. 
The income smoothing is typically used by the upper level managers to achieve the 
bonus incentives related to the fulfillment of targeted income (Burgstahler&Dichev, 
1997). Watts and Zimmerman (1986), in their hypotheses of bonus plan, added that the 
managers are intended to move the future income to the current income due to the 
incentive plan. Moreover, Balsam (1998) indicated that there is a positive relationship 
between the compensation contracts and the discretionary accruals as the representation 
of the earning management practice. The executive compensation has been the utmost 
medium to keep the top level management work in line with the expectation of the 
shareholders, which highly desire them to take higher risk in an attempt to reach higher 
performance and higher dividend payout. Conversely, the perception of the top level 
managers are different when they are willing to take the low risk since they perceive that 
their compensation are relied mostly on the evaluation of the performance. Hence, the 
performance of the corporation remains unchanged through time (Fama& French, 1992; 
Beatty &Zajac, 1994). In addition, top level managers concern about their personal 
wealth and tenure which are able to be affected by the high fluctuations (Ronen &Sadan, 
1981, Carlson &Bathala, 1997) whereas the investors are careless and do not do any 
favor for that (Badrinath, Gay, & Kale, 1989).  Therefore, income smoothing has been 
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the best the solution for them to reduce the extreme fluctuations and to earn the 
remuneration.  
H1: Executive compensation has the significant positive relationship with income 
smoothing  
Apart from that, good corporate governance is useful to manage the agency problems 
occurred during the different interest between the principal (shareholders) and agent 
(managers) because both of these individuals are rational, which is shown by the 
interests to maximize their wealth and might create moral hazard. The actions of income 
smoothing is started from the rule from the shareholders expectations to earn higher 
return. To earn the higher return, shareholders motivate the managers within the 
corporations to have a better performance, which, at the end, lead to the income 
smoothing by the managers to show the stable earning and earn the targeted bonus. On 
the other hand, the shareholders, who need the reliable data for future earning, desire to 
apply the GCG to have more quality information about the income even though the 
income is unstable (Makaryanawati&Milani, 2008). The mechanism of corporate 
governance, represented by composition of the board of directors (Nasution&Setiawan, 
2005; Nagi, 2003) and audit committee (Nasution&Setiawan, 2005) has the significant 
negative relationship with the income smoothing. It shows that the independent parties in 
the board of directors are able to decrease the income smoothing as well as the existence 
of audit committee.  
H2: GCG is significantly and negatively related to the income smoothing 
The main agency problems arise when the company make a decision to allocate the large 
amount of FCF. Managers are willing to allocate the FCF to the acquisition of new assets 
or investment decision with lower return and pay lower dividend to the shareholders 
(Bhundia, 2012; Jensen, 1986). According to Jensen (1986), as the managers is not able 
to maintain the high dividend payout constantly, it results in the cut of the shares price. 
In the firm with low growth, such condition might lead to the practice of earning 
manipulation. Jensen (1986) extended that when higher free cash flow under the control 
of the managers, it is going to be invested in less prospect projects. This phenomenon 
happens because less prospect projects have lower risk, which is not going to jeopardize 
the mangers wealth and career. Furthermore, due to the high amount of free cash flow, 
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managers do not need to raise funds from other external investors and therefore, there is 
no need to provide further detailed information about the business or the project. 
Consequently, with less control from the shareholders, managers have an intention to do 
the income smoothing. 
H3: FCF has a significant positive relationship with income smoothing 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This research draws on the strength of the quantitative method to facilitate a 
comprehensive analysis on the influence of the executive compensation, FCF, and GCG 
toward the income smoothing. This research explores the secondary data, such as the 
amount of remuneration, GCG score assessment and amount of FCF. These data are 
taken from annual and financial report through online sources, which are websites of the 
entities and website of BPKP (Badan Pengawas Keuangan dan Pembangunan) 
(www.bpkp.go.id) and Detik News (www.detiknews.com).  
In this research, the populations are selected by using purposive sampling with the 
following criteria: (1) companies with a cooperation with BPKP or IICG; (2) companies 
publish the annual report and financial report regularly; (3) the annual reports of the 
companies should contain the score of GCG’s assessment, either self-assessment or 
others parties’ assessment; (4) the annual reports of the companies should contain the 
total remuneration for Board of Directors.  
All of the data are examined by using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) 16. 
Firstly, the data are tested by using classical assumption tests, which consists of 
normality, autocorrelation, multicollinearity, and heteroscedasticity test. Afterward, the 
data are tested by using Multiple Linear Regression model (MLR), which is formulated 
as follows: 
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Which are: 
 = income smoothing 
 = konstanta 
 = koefisien 
 = executive compensation 
 = good corporate governance 
 = free cash flow 
 = error 
 
Research Variables and Operational Definition 
Income smoothing 
Income smoothing is measured by using the Eckel Index. Eckel Index is going to 
differentiate the company who do (not do) the income smoothing. The formula is: 
 
Which are: 
 = change in income per period 
 = change in sales per period 
 = coefficient variation of change in income per period 
 = coefficient variation of change in sales per period 
 = either  or  from period n-1 to n 
If the Eckel Index is less than 1, the companies are doing the income smoothing. 
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Executive Compensation 
It is measured by the amount of remuneration received by the Board of Directors.  
Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
It is the deduction of cash flows from operating activities with the overall capital 
expenditures. The formula is as follows: 
 
Good Corporate Governance (GCG)  
This research uses either the score of Corporate Governance Perception Index (assessed 
by the IICG) or classification of the GCG implementation quality (assessed by BPKP) 
provided in the annual report. Additionally, this research might also use the score of 
corporate governance self-assessment based on Acts of Ministry of State-Owned Entity.  
4. RESULTS 
The determination of the samples has gone through a purposive sampling process as 
follows: 
Criteria Amount 
Companies with a cooperation with BPKP or IICG 65 
Companies publish the annual and financial reports irregularly (or even not 
publish) 
(51) 
Annual reports contain no GCG score (0) 
Annual reports contain no remuneration of Board of Directors (0) 
Not supporting data (1) 
Total companies chosen as samples 13 
Total samples for 2008, 2009, 2012, 2015, and 2016 28 
 
The annual and financial reports are published by each websites of the entities. The 
financial reports consist of statement of income, statement of cash flows, and notes to 
financial statement, so as to find the annual income, sales, cash flow from operating 
activities, capital expenditures, and the structure of Board of Directors. At first, all of the 
representative data of the research are found ranging from 2006 until 2016. However, it 
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has been narrowed due to the calculation of the Eckel Index. Those 10 years are divided 
into each first 3 years, next 3 years, the following 2 years, and the last 2 years. The 
separation of time is aimed to give clearer tendency of the companies to smooth the 
income. Consequently, there are only certain years are exercised as the samples: 2008, 
2009, 2012, 2015, and 2016. For that reason, the total samples merely cover partial 
period from 2008 until 2016. Overall, there are 4 samples which shows no income 
smoothing (Non-smoother) whereas the rests are doing income smoothing (Smoother). 
The details are shown as follows: 
Companies 2008 2009 2012 2014 2015 2016 
PT AdhiKarya   S    
PT Aneka Tambang  S S    
PT AngkasaPura I   S  S  
PT AngkasaPura II   S  S  
PT Bank Mandiri  S NS  S NS 
PT HutamaKarya   S S S  
PT JasaMarga  S S S  S 
PT Pelabuhan Indonesia II   NS    
PT Pertamina  S     
PerumPeruri   S    
PT Sucofindo  NS     
PT WaskitaKarya   S S   
PT WijayaKarya S  S S S  
 
The result of the classical assumptions test are as follows: 
Classical 
Assumptions test 
Test Result Notes 
Normality test 
One Sample 
Kolmogorov 
Smirnov 
0.105 
The research data are normally 
distributed 
Autocorrelation 
test 
Durbin 
Watson 
1.847 
There is no autocorrelation in 
the overall research data since 
1.847 is bigger than 1.605 and 
less than 2.395 (See: Durbin 
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Watson Table) 
Multicollinearity 
test 
Collinearity 
Statistic 
(VIF) 
1.085 (GCG) 
1.319 (FCF) 
1.319 (Excom) 
When the VIF value is less than 
1 and not more than 10, there is 
no multicollinearity exists. 
Heteroscedasticity Glejser Test 
0.972 (GCG) 
0.631 (FCF) 
0.870 (Excom) 
When the significance levels are 
exceeding α = 5%, there is no 
heteroscedasticity exists. 
 
In order to complete all the hypotheses and research problems, the hypotheses test 
consists of two kinds of test, namely T test and F test. T test is aimed to find the effect of 
the independent variables on income smoothing respectively whereas F test is aimed to 
find the effect of simultaneous independent variables on income smoothing. The results 
of both test are presented below. 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) .488 3.070  .159 .875 
Good Corporate 
Governance 
-.003 .035 -.015 -.087 .931 
Free Cash Flow 7.711E-14 .000 .640 3.451 .002 
Executive 
Compensation 
-2.893E-13 .000 -.058 -.313 .757 
 
The table above is the result of T Test which determine the effect of each 
independent variables on the dependent variables. According to the table, the formulation 
of the regression model is: 
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In brief, the hypotheses result are managed as follows: 
No Variables Sig. Inferences 
1 Executive Compensation 0.757 H1 is rejected 
2 Good Corporate Governance 0.931 H2 is rejected 
3 Free Cash Flow 0.002 H3 is accepted 
 
On the other hand, the presentation of the result of F test is as follows: 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 11.390 3 3.797 4.781 .009
a
 
Residual 19.057 24 .794   
Total 30.447 27    
As the value of the F presented above is greater than the F value presented in the 
percentage distribution table (4.781 > 3.01) and the significance level is lower than the 
research significance level (0.009 < 0.05), the simultaneous variables are found 
significantly affecting the practice of income smoothing. While all of the variables are 
united, the control on the smoothers become efficient.  
Analysis 
According to therespective test (T test) result, one of three independent variables 
merely has a significant positive effect the income smoothing, specifically free cash flow. 
For that reason, this research share the identical idea with Jensen (1986) and Bhundia 
(2012). So, this research has same idea with those researches about the positive 
relationship between free cash flow and income smoothing due to the existence of the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders, which create a decision to allocate 
the free cash flow to the acquisition of new assets and lower-return investment decision. 
In spite of the agency problem, the other main reason of the significant positive 
relationship between FCF and income smoothing is about the weak internal control 
systems from the shareholders (principal) which might cause the information asymmetry 
and results in the opportunistic action of the managers. In addition, Mohammadi, 
Maharlouie, and Mansouri (2012) also extended that managers that hold a higher cash 
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have a higher motivation to smooth the income to achieve their goals. Contrarily, the 
result of the research has opposed the previous researches (Healy, 1985; Harahap, 2005) 
by pronouncing the insignificant relationship between executive compensation and 
income smoothing. In spite of the insignificant relationship, the regression model has 
developed the negative impact of the executive compensation on income smoothing. 
This research confirms the finding proposed by Anthonia (2016) which stated that the 
change in total compensation is not sufficient to influence the decision of Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO) to do income smoothing. According to her research, there are other 
stronger factors which might be able to lead to the practice of income smoothing, such as 
characteristics. The research explained that the characteristics of the CFO consists of 
education, tenure, age, and gender. Initially, those characteristics have positive and 
significant relationship with income smoothing rather than executive compensation. On 
the other hand, Manullang (2015) highlighted that the insignificant relationship between 
executive compensation and income smoothing is affected by the consideration of the 
board of directors, especially about the risk, and also strong internal control systems. 
Additionally, the insignificant negative relationship between executive compensation and 
income smoothing happen because most of the companies in Indonesia have the 
permanent design of salaries and remuneration whereas the variable-oriented and 
manageable salaries and remuneration design is lesser. Consequently, the board of 
directors is less attracted to do the income smoothing (Wardani, 2012). Meanwhile, the 
result of the T test shows insignificant negative relationship between GCG and income 
smoothing as well. Hence, the effective GCG implementation has an ability to control 
the practice of income smoothing, despite there is a small chance for income smoothing 
existence. In spite of the different result of the relationship between each independent 
variables and independent variable, the simultaneous test (F test) of the research results 
in 0.009 significance. From this result, the executive compensation, FCF, and GCG has a 
significant impact on income smoothing if they are exercised simultaneously. Therefore, 
the control on the income smoothing is become effective. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS  
In respective test (T Test), the only independent variables that has a significant positive 
relationship with income smoothing practice is FCF, whereas the other independent 
variables, executive compensation and GCG, are found insignificantly related to income 
smoothing, although both of them are negatively affect the income smoothing as 
described by the regression model. Therefore, the finding is consistent with Research 
Problem 2, and the other findings are inconsistent with Research Question 1 and 3. On 
simultaneous test (F test), executive compensation, FCF, and GCG are found 
significantly and positively related to the income smoothing, which is indicated by the 
significance level of 0.009. For that reason, the finding of the research is consistent with 
Research Problem 4.  
Recommendations for Future Research 
Several limitations of this research have to be acknowledged. Firstly, this research 
exercises small and homogeneous samples. For details, all of the respondents are state-
owned entities and most of them are manufacturing-based. More researches about 
income smoothing can be performed by using wide and heterogeneous samples, such as 
family-owned and private-owned entities from various industries. So, the result is more 
reliable and extensive. Secondly, this research focuses more on three factors that catalyze 
the practice of income smoothing, namely executive compensation, GCG, and FCF. 
Future research need to be conducted to find the other factors that might affect the 
practice of income smoothing in Indonesia, such as age, gender, tenure, education, 
culture, profitability, auditors’ reputation, and internal control systems. Thirdly, this 
research applies Eckel Index to classify the smoother and non-smoother. In fact, there are 
various indexes existed, such as Michelson. Therefore, future research is stimulated to 
use another indexes and compare to the Eckel Index which has been commonly used by 
previous researchers.  Next, this research merely exercises the secondary data from 
online sources and books. Thus, the future research is encouraged to change the 
orientation to qualitative research with primary data from the field for its validity and 
reliability.Lastly, for this research relies best on the information on annual report and 
financial report, the other external aspects such as inflation and government policies are 
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ignored. So, future should be conducted with different formulas, with respect to those 
aspects.   
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